"The denial of the right to secede from a voluntary union is itself a primary justification for secession"
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ASP In-depth State and Region pages
| Alaska |
| Arizona |
| California |
| Cascadia |
| Hawai'i |
| New England |
| New Hampshire |
| North Carolina |
| South Carolina |
| Texas |
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Vermont
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Antifederalist Papers
| No. 1 General Introduction: A Dangerous Plan Of Benefit Only to The "Aristocratick Combination" | No. 2 "We Have Been Told of Phantoms" |
| No. 3 New Constitution Creates a National Government; Will Not Abate Foreign Influence; Dangers of Civil War and Despotism | No. 4 Foreign Wars, Civil Wars and Indian Wars - Three Bugbears |
| No. 5 Scotland and England - A Case in Point | No. 6 The Hobgoblins of Anarchy and Dissensions Among the States |
| No. 7 Adoption of the Constitution Will Lead to Civil War | No. 8 The Power Vested in Congress of Sending Troops For Suppressing Insurrections Will Always Enable Them to Stifle the First Struggles of Freedom |
| No. 9 A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny | No. 10 On the Preservation of Parties, Public Liberty Depends |
| No. 11 Unrestricted Power Over Commerce Should Not Be Given the National Government | No. 12 How Will the New Government Raise Money? |
| No. 13 The Expense of the New Government | No. 14 Extent of Territory Under Consolidated Government Too Large to Preserve Liberty or Protect Property |
| No. 15 Rhode Island is Right! | No. 16 Europeans Admire and Federalists Decry the Present System |
| No. 17 Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority | No. 18-20 What Does History Teach (Part 1) |
| No. 18-20 What Does History Teach (Part 2) | No. 21 Why the Articles Failed |
| No. 22 Articles of Confederation Simply Requires Amendments, Particularly For Commercial Power and Judicial Power; Constitution Goes Too Far | No. 23 Certain Powers Necessary For the Common Defense, Can and Should Be Limited |
| No. 24 Objections to A Standing Army (Part 1) | No. 25 Objections to A Standing Army (Part 2) |
| No. 26 The Use of Coercion By the New Government (Part 1) | No. 27 The Use of Coercion By the New Government (Part 2) |
| No. 28 The Use of Coercion By the New Government (Part 3) | No. 29 Objections to National Control of the Militia |
| No. 30-31 A Virginia Antifederalist on the Issue of Taxation | No. 32 Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of Implied Powers (Part 1) |
| No. 33 Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of Implied Powers (Part 2) | No. 34 The Problem of Concurrent Taxation |
| No. 35 Federal Taxing Power Must Be Restrained | No. 36 Representation and Internal Taxation |
| No. 37 Factions and the Constitution | No. 38 Some Reactions to Federalist Arguments |
| No. 39 Appearance and Reality - the Form is Federal; the Effect is National | No. 40 On the Motivations and Authority of the Founding Fathers |
| No. 41-43 "The Quantity of Power the Union Must Possess is One Thing; the Mode of Exercising the Powers Given is Quite a Different Consideration"(Part 1) | No. 41-43 "The Quantity of Power the Union Must Possess is One Thing; the Mode of Exercising the Powers Given is Quite a Different Consideration"(Part 2) |
| No. 44 What Congress Can Do; What A State Can Not | No. 45 Powers of National Government Dangerous to State Governments; New York as an Example |
| No. 46 "Where Then is the Restrain?" | No. 47 "Balance" of Departments Not Achieved Under New Constitution |
| No. 48 No Separation of Departments Results in No Responsibility | No. 49 On Constitutional Conventions (Part 1) |
| No. 50 On Constitutional Conventions (Part 2) | No. 51 Do Checks and Balances Really Secure the Rights of the People? |
| No. 52 On the Guarantee of Congressional Biennial Elections | No. 53 A Plea For the Right of Recall |
| No. 54 Apportionment and Slavery: Northern and Southern Views | No. 55 Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Represetative? (Part 1) |
| No. 56 Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Represetative? (Part 2) | No. 57 Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Represetative? (Part 3) |
| No. 58 Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Represetative? (Part 4) | No. 59 The Danger of Congressional Control of Elections |
| No. 60 Will The Constitution Promote the Interests of Favorite Classes? | No. 61 Questions and Comments on the Constitutional Provisions Regarding the Election of Congressmen |
| No. 62 On the Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part 1) | No. 63 On the Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part 2) |
| No. 64 On the Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part 3) | No. 65 On the Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part 4) |
| No. 66 From North Carolina | No. 67 Various Fears Concerning the Executive Department |
| No. 68 On the Mode of Electing the President | No. 69 The Character of the Executive Office |
| No. 70 The Powers and Dangerous Potentials of His Elected Majesty | No. 71 The Presidential Term of Office |
| No. 72 On the Electoral College; On ReEligibility of the President | No. 73 Does the Presidential Veto Power Infringe on the Separation of Departments? |
| No. 74 The President as Military King | No. 75 A Note Protesting the Treaty-Making Provisions of the Consitution |
| No. 76-77 An Antifederalist View of the Appointing Power Under the Consitution | No. 78-79 The Power of the Judiciary (Part 1) |
| No. 80 The Power of the Judiciary (Part 2) | No. 81 The Power of the Judiciary (Part 3) |
| No. 82 The Power of the Judiciary (Part 4) | No. 83 The Federal Judiciary and the Issue of Trial by Jury |
| No. 84 On the Lack of a Bill of Rights | No. 85 Concluding Remarks: Evils Under Confederation Exaggerated; Constitution Must Be Drastically Revised Before Adoption |
North American * Secession and Independence Movements
*Hawaii and Puerto Rico are obviously not part of North America, no offense intended
Active Secession Movements Around the World
One Nation Indivisible? A Study of Secession and the Constitution